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Abstract 
 
 
The empirical analysis of the determinants of institutional development in tran-
sition countries as well as the qualitative country studies summarized in this publi-
cation allow for some optimism concerning a potential impact of the EU on insti-
tution building and governance quality in CIS countries. Regression analysis re-
veals a positive impact of EU cooperation agreements below a membership per-
spective. Alternatively to the EU, entry into the NATO accession process also ex-
erts incentives for better institutions which are often overlooked. In contrast, WTO 
membership is not found to have any impact on institution building in CIS coun-
tries. While there is room for some EU-related optimism given the results from the 
regression analysis it depends on the country-specific ENP action plans and pro-
grams whether or not ENP cooperation actually leads to Europeanization or insti-
tutional convergence towards EU standards in the CIS. The case studies on the 
effectiveness of Neighborhood Europeanization through ENP in Ukraine, Georgia, 
and Azerbaijan reveal that current EU policies towards these countries can be, at 
best, seen as a catalyst but not as a main driver of institutional convergence. A per-
spective for a stake in the internal market is on the long horizon for Ukraine only. 
ENP mechanisms for conflict resolution in Georgia and Azerbaijan have been 
rather weak before the recent clash in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The top-down 
institutional convergence, i.e. an EU-first strategy, worked well for Enlargement 
Europeanization but implemented in the ENP it significantly reduces the leverage 
of the EU to create a ring of well-governed neighbour states. 
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Preface 
This report summarizes the analysis of institutional development in CIS coun-
tries and its convergence towards EU standards.1 Building EU-style institutions is 
a precondition for entry into the EU. The process of EU enlargement is tightly 
bound to the concept of convergence, as membership in the EU requires fulfill-
ment of a series of political, legal, and economic criteria. Candidate countries must 
demonstrate political stability as a guarantee for a democratic and lawful order, 
including maintaining human rights standards and ensuring the protection of mi-
norities (political criteria). Furthermore, the potential members must fully imple-
ment the “Acquis Communautaire” (the entire body of EU law) into national legis-
lation, and adopt the goals of the political, economic and monetary union (legal 
criteria). Finally, the candidates must have a fully functioning market economy 
with the ability to maintain competitiveness in the internal market (economic crite-
ria). Increasingly, institutional development is not only extremely important for 
potential accession candidates but for any country that has any “association” rela-
tionship with the EU. 
Beyond any EU accession or association perspective, emerging market econo-
mies will also benefit directly from institutional development. Empirical studies 
clearly show that institutions are an important explanatory variable for differences 
in economic performance. Some authors (e.g. Rodrik 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002) even suggest that 
institutional weaknesses are the only fundamental reason for development failures, 
i.e. that long-run differences in income levels are solely determined by differences 
in institutional quality. 
In the interim report (Deliverable 24’)2, we have provided a quite comprehen-
sive overview on theoretical foundations of institutional change and developed an 
extended database including alternative indicators and potential determinants. 
Drawing on this work documented in the interim report, Section A starts with a 
categorization of established institutional indicators according to the EU’s Copen-
                                                 
1 The authors thank the participants of the ENEPO workshops, which were organized by 
CASE in Kyiv and Warsaw, for helpful comments on an earlier draft.  We would like to 
thank Marek Dabrowski, Maryla Maliszewska, Anna Maciążek, Akelyeva Irina, Gleb 
Shymanovich, and Michaela Rank for comments and excellent editorial support. 
2 See http://www.case.com.pl/dyn/plik--15324587.pdf 
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hagen criteria. Based on four indicators – the World Bank Governance Indicators, 
Index of Economic Freedom, EBRD index, and Polity IV – a stylized picture is 
developed showing institutional development in CIS countries as compared to 
other transition countries, i.e. new member states of the EU, Balkan countries, and 
groups of CIS countries. 
Since the interim report we completed the quantitative part of our work with an 
econometric study on determinants of institutional change in transition countries 
(Section B). This study uses the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI), in 
our view the most comprehensive measure of institutional development. The study 
fills a gap in the literature because it explicitly models different types of potential 
external drivers while other studies concentrate on internal (political, economic, 
cultural) drivers in the first place (Di Tommaso, Raiser, and Weeks 2007; Beck 
and Laevan 2006). We distinguish between institutional influences, trade and capi-
tal flows, and proximity measures. Among the institutional influences we distin-
guish between different depth of integration with the EU but we also consider a 
potential impact of NATO and WTO agreement. We found that both basic EU co-
operation agreements as well as the start of the membership process had a positive 
influence on institutional development. In addition, economic liberalization poli-
cies also improved governance in transition countries which support optimism 
about breaking path-dependency due to political tensions and cultural settings. 
Most importantly for our work, it provides the working hypothesis for our country 
studies that below-membership incentives from the EU may matter as well as eco-
nomic reform policies which point to a potential role of the business sector as an 
important actor for institutional change in transition countries. 
In the qualitative part (Section C), we provide country analysis of institutional 
and economic developments in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) coun-
tries Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine. We have chosen these countries as they 
represent the most enthusiastic (Georgia, Ukraine) and more reluctant (Azerbaijan) 
participants of the ENP. In such a way, we take into account varying political pre-
conditions for Europeanization through the ENP. In Section C, we provide a very 
short summary of our analytical framework and the results of the qualitative stud-
ies. The qualitative studies analyze the individual relationship between the EU and 
each of these states, which is not only influenced by the ENP itself, but also by the 
previous forms of cooperation like PCAs and lilateral issues related, for example 
to economic cooperation or national conflicts. We introduce Section C by provid-
ing some comparative statistics, again drawing on the work documented in the 
interim report. 
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A. Introduction ─ Institutional 
Development in CIS Countries 
Transition of former socialist countries into market economies was a phenome-
non which inspired rethinking the role of institutions in reform programs. While 
the so-called Washington Consensus concentrated on structural adjustment and 
stabilization, the 1990s brought an increasing economic literature on the impact of 
institutions on economic development (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rodrik 
2006; Schweickert and Thiele 2004). The search for empirical evidence inspired 
international and private institutions to create indicators in order to measure insti-
tutional development.  
Hence, the emergence of indicators that are able to sufficiently observe institu-
tional change within an economic framework has only recently been addressed. 
Even though a large number of economic indicators such as GDP, trade shares, 
financial flows, as well as indicators on political stability were available, measures 
that relate to the overall concept of institutional development were with few ex-
ceptions inexistent for a long time.  
In the mid 1990s, international financial institutions have developed the con-
cept of governance and evaluated the quality of government and the soundness of 
economic policy in transition economies. Therefore, they created qualitative and 
quantitative indicators to assess the quality of governance and tried to identify the 
causality chains behind growth, institutional quality and government performance 
in order to improve policy recommendations, lending scenarios and to be able to 
track the transition process. Indicators of institutional quality are subject of interest 
by scholars, policy-makers and financial analysts alike. In contrast to the risk indi-
cators, which were used previously, governance indicators try to catch certain 
“soft” aspects that contribute to growth as e.g. ethical values. 
The focus in this paper will be on the indicators that evaluate the quality of in-
stitutions within the transition process. Until the late 1990s, the only individual 
indicators on some separate governance elements have existed (for more informa-
tion on governance indicators see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 in the interim re-
port3). Polity IV Index constructed by the Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management gives information on regime and authority characteris-
                                                 
3 http://www.case.com.pl/dyn/plik--15324587.pdf. 
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tics for all independent states. Bertelsmann Foundation identifies the status of de-
mocratization and market liberalization and created Transformation Index. Trans-
parency International measures corruption. Freedom House monitors civil and 
political rights, democratic governance, rule of law and freedom of media around 
the world. The Heritage Foundation identifies institutions that determine the de-
gree of economic freedom. Costs of doing business created by the World Bank 
supplies the information about complexity of entrepreneurship and the institutional 
environment in a single country. The EBRD identifies the level of liberalization in 
the economic terms with such indicators as price liberalization, foreign exchange 
and trade liberalization and small scale privatization; as well as institutional de-
velopment providing enterprise reform and governance indicator, banking reform 
index and non-banking financial sector reform indicator. Therefore, it was impos-
sible to deliver a general view on governance and institutional development.  
Starting in 1996, the World Bank came up with aggregate indicators which 
cover institutional development rather comprehensively (Kaufmann et al. 2005). 
These indicators report on six dimensions of governance which referring to 
Schweickert (2004) can be matched into three groups: 
Legislative Institutions: 
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence; 
• Voice and Accountability. 
Executive Institutions: 
• Government Effectiveness; 
• Quality of Regulations. 
Judicial Institutions: 
• Rule of Law; 
• Control of Corruption. 
The World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) are, in our view, the most ap-
propriate indicators to analyze the governance in a broad perspective and its con-
sequences for economic development by introducing appropriate incentive struc-
tures, reducing uncertainty and promoting efficiency among participants of an 
economy, and, finally, providing policy rules to enforce the institutional setting.  
However, critics argue that the current indicators have technical and conceptual 
deficits, as they provide only poor measures of key governance processes (Cout et 
al. 2002; Arndt and Oman, 2006; Knack, 2006; Kurtz and Shrank, 2006) and the 
data often face little objectiveness, as it is based on expert opinion or polls. The 
provided data also lack credibility as ratings tend to reflect the political or ideo-
logical agenda of organizations providing the ratings - good economic outcomes 
tend to receive high ratings. Another general critique is expressed concerning the 
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weighting of indices. Ahrens (2002:38) states that often indirect measures (prox-
ies) of institutions are used. For example, political instability is measured by coups 
or assassinations. Corruption measures often focus on the coordination of private 
interests, rather than on a combination of private and public interests. Different 
organizations measure corruption based on different questionnaires and there is no 
consistent concept that underlies the definition of corruption.  
Despite these shortcomings of quantification, we had to rely on some measure 
of institutional quality in CIS countries. We choose to take the WBGI in the first 
place because, thinking about a potential impact of EU integration and neighbor-
hood strategies or the convergence of CIS countries towards (Western) European 
standards, this set of indicators covers most of what constitutes the Copenhagen 
criteria: human rights, participation, rule-of-law, and effectiveness of government 
and control of corruption (Schweickert 2004). Nevertheless, we considered other 
indicators as well.  
Referring to the Copenhagen criteria we divided indicators into three groups: 
political, economic and legal. First, we analyzed which of the individual indicators 
are included in or excluded in the WBGI. Special attention was on the economic 
criteria, as they involve not only economic institutional requirements, basi-
cally - administrative institutions, but criteria on a functioning of the market econ-
omy as well. Hence, we separated economic indicators on macroeconomic stabil-
ity and liberalization from administrative indicators on governance (Table 1). 
Based on the overview provided by Table 1 we base our descriptive analysis on 
four indicators which cover institutions quite comprehensively:  
• World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGIall); 
• Polity IV; 
• Heritage Index of Economic Freedom (Herall); 
• EBRD Institutional Indicator (EBRDinst). 
As argued above, the WBGIall provides the broadest picture of institutional 
quality and an international comparable yardstick. The other three indicators may 
be seen as providing a kind of robustness check for the WBGI because they view 
institutions from a specific perspective. We use the Polity IV indicator in order to 
check whether a strictly political indicator provides a different picture. The 
EBRDinst and the Herall indicator are biased towards an economic view. While 
the EBRDinst indicator provides a European measure, the Herall indicator – like 
the WBGI – allows for international comparisons and is strongly biased towards a 
“western” or neo-liberal economic perspective. We think that this choice allows us 
to map institutional development in CIS countries fairly well. 
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In Table 2, these indicators have been standardized and aggregated for CIS 
countries, for our sample countries Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as 
well as for our benchmark countries EU-Baltic and EU-NMS (New Member 
States: Romania and Bulgaria). As was to be expected, the Baltic countries outper-
form the NMS and CIS countries. One could clearly find in Table 2 that the 
WBGIall indicator provides an aggregate picture of institutional development 
since the country groupings remain fairly the same if one compares the WBGIall 
with the standardized aggregate. 
There are, however, significant differences between the aggregate and the sin-
gle indicators. These differences could be interpreted by the different perspective 
taken by the four indicators. E.g. the differences are generally more pronounced in 
the case of the Polity IV indicator. However, the differences in rankings could 
only be interpreted when integrating the determinants of institutional development 
which may be reflected differently in the four indicators on institutions.  
Generally, it is fairly well established that countries with higher levels of in-
come also show better institutions. Kaufmann (2004) evaluates “governance defi-
cit” as the “distance” between a country’s actual governance level and the level 
required to support and sustain its income per capita level. Different to other theo-
ries, we adopt a European benchmark and we calculate the “income fragility” 
(Figure 1). The level of governance which insures sustainable income is one that a 
country is expected to place on the fitted trend line for its level of income. Figure 1 
plots the strong positive correlation between real GDP per capita adjusted for dif-
ferences in purchasing power and the governance, accounted as a simple average 
of the WBGI for the EU-27 member states in 2006.  
An estimate of the income fragility for a country is derived by the vertical dis-
tance between the actual income estimate for one of CIS countries and the “best 
fit” estimate according to the governance level with respect to the trend line, 
drawn for correlation between income and governance in the EU.  
While Ukraine and Azerbaijan are close to governance levels that are expected 
according to the income level, Russia and Turkmenistan show large governance 
deficits about the equivalent of three standard deviations in governance quality. 
For these countries with significant income fragility, it can be suggested that their 
income level may be particularly fragile in the medium to long term, unless con-
certed efforts to improve governance are under way. The other extreme is repre-
sented by Georgia and Armenia where governance is of around half a standard 
deviation above the trend line, implying that level of governance in these countries 
could support higher incomes in the future. Nevertheless, this approximation 
serves as an illustration and does not pretend to fully account for some other coun-
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try specific characteristics like oil and gas endowments, as in case of Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. 
At the same time, the trend line, calculated on the basis of data for the EU-27, 
actually represents an appropriate average for CIS countries as well. However, the 
variance around this average is much more pronounced around CIS compared to 
EU countries. This is consistent with the assumption that determinants other then 
the level of income are particularly relevant for CIS countries. It is of special in-
terest in this context to consider external and internal determinants in an appropri-
ate way. This was done by applying panel estimation techniques. 
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B. External vs. Internal Drivers of 
Institutional Change in Transition 
Countries 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of Europeanization, i.e. the adoption of EU rules by transition 
countries, is possibly “the most massive international rule transfer in recent his-
tory” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The Copenhagen criteria of EU ac-
cession demand the fulfillment of a series of political, legal and economic criteria 
known as “Copenhagen Criteria” (Foders, Piazolo and Schweickert 2002). So far, 
the EU has indeed been successful in promoting democracy and economic devel-
opment by fostering institution building in most central and eastern European tran-
sition countries (Roland 2006).  
However, after Eastern Enlargement has been completed with the recent acces-
sion of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the “carrot” of membership for pushing 
institutional development in transition countries is currently reserved for the West-
ern Balkan states exclusively. For CIS as well as for Mediterranean countries, 
ENP foresees support from the EU dependent on performance according to gov-
ernance criteria. However, compared to the big “carrot” of membership ENP in-
centives may be too limited in order support internal drivers of institutional reform 
(Afanasyeva, Hammermann, and Schweickert 2007; Vinhas de Souza et al. 2006).  
So far, the empirical evidence on external drivers of institutional change in 
transtition countries is rather limited. Recent papers mainly focus on internal eco-
nomic, political, and cultural drivers (Di Tommaso, Raiser, and Weeks 2007; Beck 
and Laeven 2006) treating an EU influence rather as a control variable than as a 
main driver of institutional change. Hence, this paper fills an empirical gap by fo-
cusing on external influences in the first place. This implies to distinguish between 
EU cooperation and neighborhood instruments and the full-scale accession in-
struments. In addition, we consider all relevant clubs a European transition country 
may join and which provides positive incentives for better institutions. While pa-
pers analyzing the impact of trade relations include WTO membership (see, e.g., 
Busse et al. 2007), the accession to NATO as a driver for institutional change re-
ceives little attention. Our panel estimations indeed reveal that, in addition to EU 
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agreements, NATO accession has a positive impact on institutional change in 
European transition countries.  
 
 
2. External and Internal Drivers of Institutional Change 
 
The case of European transition countries is clearly different from other devel-
oping and emerging market economies. Compared to developed countries, all of 
them show a backlog in terms of institutional development. However, the reunifi-
cation of Europe after the breakdown of communist regimes has provided a strong 
pull effect concerning the development of good institutions. Looking at the various 
clubs which European transition countries may join, one could argue that EBRD, 
World Bank and IMF are important players providing incentives for reforms. 
While this is certainly true, there is no exclusive accession process which would 
demand institutional preconditions. Therefore, the impact of these institutions 
seems to be rather permanent and program specific. This is different for the EU 
but also for NATO and WTO (see Table 3 for the chronology of accession).  
Concerning the impact of the EU on institutional change, there seems to be lit-
tle doubt that membership matters. Way and Levitsky (2007) explain the institu-
tional divide between a democratic Central and Southeastern Europe and an auto-
cratic CIS by potential membership in the EU. Similarly, Pop-Eleches (2007) ar-
gues that post-communist democratization has been faster and less prone to rever-
sals in the countries where for geographic, historical, cultural, and economic rea-
sons the promise of deep integration with Western Europe was the strongest at the 
outset of the transition. According to Haughton (2007) the EU’s ‘transformative 
power’ is strongest when deciding to open accession negotiations. The EU’s influ-
ence is also shown to be stronger in some areas, especially in economic aspects 
necessary to establish the single market, while it is clearly weaker in other areas 
like minority protection. Schimmelfennig (2007) argues that only the credible 
conditional promise of membership has had the potential to produce compliance 
with liberal-democratic norms in norm violating transformation countries. Accord-
ing to case studies on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, EU democratic conditionality 
is shown to work through a strategy of “reinforcement by reward” through inter-
governmental bargaining. These arguments are confirmed by Beck and Leaven 
(2006) who show that a dummy variable for EU membership provides an addi-
tional positive effect on institutional change in European transition countries as 
measured by the WBGI. However, the cross country approach adopted by this pa-
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per only allows to include control variables like EU membership one-by-one 
which creates serious problems of misspecification.  
In contrast, only a few studies analyze the impact of the EU on institutional 
change by means of agreements below a membership perspective. Positive effects 
of links to the EU may be reached via a variety of channels: promotion of democ-
ratic attitudes among citizens, political incentives for elites (in government and in 
the opposition), domestic power balance shifts in favor of democratic politicians, 
and promotion of better democratic governance through incentives for public ad-
ministration reform (Pop-Eleches 2007). Hence, democracy is promoted by a 
combination of political conditionality with significant political and economic in-
centives. Di Tommaso, Raiser, and Weeks (2007) confirm the positive impact of 
basic agreements between the EU and transition countries which are open to all 
transition countries. While this would allow for some optimism regarding weak 
incentives provided by the ENP, the paper uses indicators from the EBRD for 
measuring institutional change in terms of economic institutions only. Apart from 
the fact, that the EBRD itself is an actor in the transition process and, hence, may 
provide biased views on success and failure, the Europeanization strategy of the 
EU is not restricted to a narrow concept of economic institutions but targets politi-
cal and legal institutions as well. Hence, the robustness of the result is to be 
checked by estimating the impact of basic EU agreements on a broad concept of 
institutional development as measured by the WBGI and by considering the im-
pact of a membership perspective at the same time. 
While this process of EU enlargement figured prominently in the transition lit-
erature, NATO membership and enlargement is almost omitted. A few studies dis-
cussed NATO impact in terms of economic aspects of regional security (see, e.g., 
Sandler and Hartley 1999; Andrei and Teodorescu 2005) and democracy promo-
tion (see, e.g. Barany 2004; Boonstra 2007; Epstein 2005). Interestingly, the 
NATO also has developed a concept for enlargement. As a procedure for nations 
wishing to join NATO, a mechanism called Membership Action Plan (MAP) was 
approved in NATO’s Washington Summit in 1999. A country’s participation in 
MAP entails the annual presentation of reports concerning its progress on five dif-
ferent measures. Four measures on organization, resources, safeguards, and com-
patibility – like the acquis in the case of the EU - rather look at the potential of 
(military) cooperation between the accession country and NATO. The first and 
possibly the most important measure demands the willingness to settle interna-
tional, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means and to commit to 
the rule of law and human rights, and democratic control of the armed forces. 
Hence, NATO accession requires a kind of minimum institutional standards. The 
“carrot” in this case being regional security rather than economic cooperation. 
Hence, it could be argued that NATO accession could have a positive effect which 
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might be comparable to the impact of EU accession (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig 
2007 and Pop-Eleches 2007). 
In addition to EU and NATO, the WTO also provides major incentives for in-
stitution building. Beyond its direct impact on import liberalization and macroeco-
nomic policies, WTO membership helps to reduce incentives for corruption by 
providing countries with powerful institutional checks and balances in the interna-
tional economic sphere. To become the WTO member, the set of institutions and 
policies should be implemented. Consequently, these WTO-conforming institu-
tions and policies contribute to the openness of the economy, enhance the trans-
parency and promote the rule of law (Bacchetta and Drabek 2004). The institu-
tional quality is even affected long before the actual accession to the WTO in the 
process of the preparation and separate negotiations between countries. However, 
as reported in Busse et al. (2007) empirical papers largely fail to show a significant 
impact once trade flows are controlled for.  
In addition to membership in international institutions, proximity (to the West) 
can be assumed to matter in various dimensions (Way and Levitsky 2007; Vinhas 
de Souza et al. 2006).  
• Proximity to the West in terms of cultural norms could be assumed to 
provide a significant path-dependency concerning institutional develop-
ment (Di Tommasso, Raiser, and Weeks 2007; Kitschelt 2001; La Porta, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1999). A society’s culture adapts rather slowly to 
changing economic circumstances because of a high persistence of cul-
tural norms and human belief systems. At the same time, religious affilia-
tion, like belonging to the community based on western Christianity, can 
be thought of as a proxy for a complex set of initial conditions.  
• Nevertheless, trade and capital flows may impact on the preconditions for 
institutional change by closer experience with the outside world. Concern-
ing trade flows, Busse et al. (2007) argue that any analysis on the relative 
impact of trade on income and growth would suffer from a lack of rele-
vant control variables, if important determinants of a successful trade lib-
eralization, such as institutional quality affecting the reallocation of re-
sources, are not included. Their results confirmed earlier work showing 
that more open economies tend to have better institutions (see, e.g. Wei 
2002; Islam and Montenegro 2002; IMF 2005). In the CIS context, 
Havrylyshyn (2006) claims that openness and sweeping reforms have re-
duced social pain in Central Europe and the Baltic states. He suggests that 
liberalization and openness ensure economic recovery and democratic in-
stitutions.  
Rainer Schweickert, Inna Melnykovska, Andrea Gawrich, Thorsten Drautzburg 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 82 20 
• Arguably, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows may also help to pro-
mote good governance in CIS countries. However, focusing on corruption, 
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2002) show that foreign firms are some-
what more likely than domestic firms to pay kickbacks for public pro-
curement contracts. Especially in countries where kickbacks are less 
common, foreign firms are more likely to engage in this form of corrup-
tion. In countries with a significant state capture problem, FDI firms are 
almost twice as likely as domestic firms to be engaged in efforts to cap-
ture the state. Hence, overall the presence of foreign firms seems to widen 
the gap between countries with good and countries with bad institutions.  
• The allocation of aid has become more selective in recent years, and has 
become more responsive to economic fundamentals and the quality of a 
country’s policy and institutional environment (Claessens, Cassimon, and 
von Campenhout 2007). Hence, aid should support institutional change. 
However, a potential problem with aid inflows is created by their direct 
impact on government behavior. By expanding a government’s external 
resources, foreign aid can weaken institutions by reducing accountability. 
Evidence suggests that industries which are most sensitive to bad govern-
ance grow at a slower pace in countries that receive more aid (Rajan and 
Subramanian 2007).  
All in all, proximity in terms of culture and trade is assumed to have a positive 
impact on institutional change while the impact of capital flows is, at least, open to 
concerns about potential moral hazard problems related to the inflow of financial 
resources. So far, an empirical analysis of all relevant external drivers of institu-
tional change in European transition countries is still lagging.  
In contrast, the analysis of internal drivers can be based on a variety of papers. 
The basic distinction is between economic and political aspects. The view that 
economic performance drives institutional development is supported by the mod-
ernization hypothesis (see, e.g., Lipset 1959; Acemoglu et al. 2007). In the same 
vein, the Grand Transition view sees development as a process where steady eco-
nomic growth causes transition of all institutions (Paldam and Gundlach 2008). 
However, economic shocks and macroeconomic instability may also be important 
factors of political transition (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Paldam 2002). These 
shocks give rise to a window of opportunity for citizens to contest power, as the 
cost of fighting with ruling autocratic regimes is relatively low. When citizens re-
ject policy changes that are easy to renege upon the window of opportunity closes, 
autocratic regimes must make democratic concessions to avoid costly repression 
(see also Brückner and Ciccone 2008). These arguments directly lead to the impor-
tance of economic policy, as opposed to economic performance, in driving institu-
tional change. Looking at the typical sequencing of reforms suggests that eco-
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nomic liberalization and privatization, as well as the granting of basic political 
rights and liberties, preceded institutional reforms such as the establishment of a 
competition authority or the adoption of bank restructuring programs and stronger 
financial market supervision. Hence, policy can to some extent break path-
dependence through economic and political liberalization (Di Tommaso, Raiser, 
and Weeks 2007; Havrylyshyn 2006).  
A political economy explanation of why institution building has varied so 
much across transition countries is provided by Beck and Laeven (2006) arguing 
that political entrenchment and reliance on natural resources critically determined 
the behavior of the ruling elite and thus whether the transition process was cata-
lytic or extractive. While this seems to support the pessimistic view that initial 
conditions determine future outcomes (Fish 1997; Kopstein and Reilly 2000; 
Guiso et al. 2006; Zweynert 2006), there is also a more optimistic view on the po-
tential for institutional progress in rent-seeking societies which links economics 
and politics. Olson (2000) argues that the availability of short- term rents like non-
renewable resources provides the basis for the rent-seeking strategy of “roving 
bandits” but that “roving bandits” could transform into “stationary bandits” after 
having reached the limits of their capacities to accumulate and control the wealth 
on the basis of informal institutions (see also Tornell 1998; Dixit, Grossman and 
Helpman 1997; Aslund 1995 and 1999).  
Concerning the influence of resource endowment on institution building, plenty 
of studies suggest that the adverse effect of resource abundance on institutional 
quality on economic growth is particularly strong for easily accessible ‘point-
source’ natural resources with concentrated production and revenues and thus 
massive rents, i.e., oil, diamonds, minerals and plantation crops rather than agri-
culture (e.g., rice, wheat and animals) where rents are more dispersed throughout 
the economy, and with easy appropriation of rents through state institutions (Auty, 
1997, 2001; Isham, et. al., 2004; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Murshed, 
2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ploeg 2007). Analyzing the political economy of 
resource-driven growth in the CIS countries, Auty (2001; 2006) finds out that 
most resource-abundant countries engender a political state that is factional or 
predatory and whose government responds slowly to economic reforms’ chal-
lenges, distorts the economy in the pursuit of rents that are deployed to force in-
dustrialization and this leads to a staple trap. The negative influence is explained 
with rent-seeking behavior and lower pressure for political reform. Other natural 
resources, such as the share of agriculture in GDP, were not found to have a nega-
tive influence.  
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3. The Empirical Model  
 
In line with the theoretical and empirical literature outlined above and as de-
scribed in Section 2, we model the impact of external and internal drivers on insti-
tutions as measured by the WBGI. The WBGI is calculated as the average of six 
single indicators as provided by the World Bank4. We argue that this is the most 
comprehensive measure of institutional development which is available for inter-
national comparisons. The WBGI include indicators on voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Hence, the aggregate indicator inte-
grates legislative, administrative and legal aspects as well as political and eco-
nomic institutions (Schweickert 2004). At the same time, the calculation of the 
indices considers measurement errors and provides standardized measures. By us-
ing the WBGI, we follow Beck and Laeven (2006) but we will consider a full 
model in terms of external and internal drivers of institutional change. In this re-
spect, we modify and extend the framework of Di Tommaso, Raiser, and Weeks 
(2007). By the fact that key variables are comparable, we are able to provide a 
kind of robustness check with respect to different measures of the endogenous 
variable, i.e. institutional change.  
As can be seen in Table 4, we group our explanatory variables into external 
drivers, internal economic drivers, and internal political drivers. This will allow us 
to distinguish between an economic and a political model of institutional change. 
According to Section 2, we consider both membership and proximity variables as 
external drivers. Membership is determined by accession to EU, NATO, and WTO. 
The derivation of the accession variables is shown in Table 3. We distinguish be-
tween two EU variables, i.e. an EU Accession variable reflecting the full-scale 
accession process and which varies from 0 (no agreement at all) to 5 (membership) 
and an EU Basic variable which is a dummy for all agreements which can be con-
cluded by all sample countries, i.e. association agreements below any membership 
commitment on the part of the EU (see also Table 3 for details). The EU Basic 
variable is similar to the EU variable used by Di Tommaso, Raiser and Weeks 
(2007). In addition, we use an EU Potential dummy variable for all actual mem-
bers or countries which have, by now, a membership perspective5. Concerning 
                                                 
4 The data as well as details on the calculation procedure is provided by the World Bank 
under http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/ 
0,,contentMDK:21499997~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.ht
ml 
5 The countries not eligible for membership are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. 
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NATO, the dummy variable reflects participation in a Membership Agreement 
Programme (MAP) assuming that this, comparable to EU Basic, provides an in-
centive for institutional reform in participating countries. Different from the EU 
and NATO, WTO membership is open to all sample countries. Hence, this dummy 
variable is one for all countries starting from the year when they entered WTO. 
Since we code the variables on a year-by-year basis, we can include them also in 
the presence of country fixed effects to asses the impact of changes of these vari-
ables over time. We expect that these variables should have a positive impact on 
institutional development.  
Proximity is measured by cultural proximity, i.e. the dummy variable reflects if 
countries belong to the western Christianity community or not6. We do not con-
sider other cultural variables because we found these to be highly correlated with 
our proximity variable while they do not reflect proximity to the same extent. We 
expect cultural proximity to have a positive impact on institutional change in 
European transition countries. In addition, economic relations constitute a form of 
proximity and are measured by FDI and aid inflows. We also test the impact of 
exports to non-transition countries in order to check for possible institutional spill-
overs through trade or to detect any evidence of learning by doing. While we 
would expect the trade variable to be positively related this seems less clear for the 
variables reflecting resource inflows which could create rent seeking effects.  
Concerning economic internal drivers, we consider both policy and perform-
ance variables. In line with Di Tommaso, Raiser, and Weeks (2007) we measure 
economic policy in terms of aggregated EBRD liberalization indicator. Not very 
surprisingly, they found a positive impact of an aggregated EBRD indicator on 
institutions. We hypothesize that the EBRD liberalization indicator should reveal a 
comparable impact on a broader concept of institutions not constructed by the 
EBRD itself. With respect to economic performance, we took the usual suspects, 
i.e. initial income at the start of the transition process and economic growth. While 
we tried three year averages of growth and a recession variable for robustness 
checks, our main variable is accumulated growth during transition assuming that 
short run ups and downs do not impact on relatively persistent institutions. We 
also use inflation as a measure of macroeconomic stability. While initial income 
revealing path-dependency can be expected to have a positive impact on institu-
                                                 
6 Physical distance as in gravity models has been used in some robustness checks only, 
since it provided little additional explanatory power when membership effects are properly 
controlled for. 
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tions, this is less clear for growth and inflation7. Either growth or stability increase 
demand for good institutions or recession and instability push institutional reform.  
As argued by Beck and Laeven (2006) the influence of political drivers 
may come from either incentives to create good institutions or from oppor-
tunities to misuse political power for extracting rents in case of resource 
economies. Regarding incentives, we consider that the way of gaining in-
dependence, i.e., whether there were any tensions during declaration of in-
dependence and in the following transition years, define the incentives to 
build up good institutions. We would expect that tensions reduce incentives 
for good governance, while the peaceful independence promotes it. Fur-
thermore, turnover from communist to democratic parties can be assumed 
to have a positive impact on institution building in contrast to situations 
where the communist party or its successor party stays in power either 
alone or in a coalition with democratic parties. Finally, cohesion of political 
parties is assumed to have a positive influence on institutional reform. Con-
cerning opportunities, we use a dummy variable measuring endowment. 
However, endowment does not necessarily reflect the exploitation of re-
sources and the related resource flows which may create moral hazard prob-
lems. Therefore, we alternatively also include flow variables like fuel ex-
ports and metal exports. We would expect that resource measures have a 
negative impact on institution building.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical estimates are based on a panel of 25 transition economies and 
the years 1996 to 20058. The empirical results based on Pooled OLS (POLS), In-
strumental Variables (IV) and (country) fixed effects (FE) estimators are presented 
in Tables 5–79. We proceed in three steps. Table 5 contains the results for the full 
model specification considering external as well as internal economic and internal 
political drivers of institutional change in transition countries. Tables 6 and 7 pre-
sent partial models. First we show the results for separate economic and political 
                                                 
7 Officially recorded GDP decline in transition countries has been overestimated (see As-
lund 2001; Dabrowski 2002). However, we assume that the error value is the same across 
transition countries.  
8 Before 2002, WBGI data is only available each two years, i.e. 1996, 1998, and 2000.  
9 For details on model specification see Drautzburg T., Melnykovska I., Schweickert R. 
(2008). 
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models which in addition to external drivers (which are both of economic and po-
litical nature) contain only variables from the two blocks of economic and political 
drivers respectively (Table 6). Finally, we show a reduced model which only in-
cludes variables from the full model which are either significant in all IV or in all 
fixed effects estimates (Table 7).  
Starting with the full model presented in Table 5, a first important result is that 
the EU variables show the expected signs and are significant in all versions of the 
model at least in the POLS estimates. EU Agreement clearly has a significant posi-
tive effect on institutional development across countries. As can be seen, our alter-
native specification of the EU impact shows that the EU Potential dummy is sig-
nificant in the case of inclusion of EU Basic variable which has been tested in Di 
Tommaso, Raiser, and Weeks (2007). This implies that a basic relationship with 
the EU as shown by the significance of EU Basic variable is positive for institu-
tional development. Hence, there is some optimism that the ENP can have an im-
pact on governance in the neighboring countries like CIS. At the same time and as 
a matter of geography, proximity to the EU in terms of both distance and potential 
membership has an additional benefit. Our EU Accession indicator picks up both 
effects which confirm the specification of this variable.  
The results for the remaining membership variables are strikingly different. As 
in other papers, a positive impact of WTO membership can not be confirmed by 
our regressions (see, e.g. Busse et al. 2007). To the contrary, NATO membership 
action plan is, with one exception, shown to be significantly positive. Arguably, 
the perspective of NATO membership provides to a certain extent different incen-
tives from those offered by the EU: regional and international security. This result 
is of special interest because there is some discussion going on with respect to the 
future role of NATO and its relation to the UN and, concerning Europe, the EU 
(see, e.g., Varwick 2005; Sandler and Hartley 1999).  
It seems important to notice the different effects of the EU and NATO vari-
ables. While the NATO variable generally fails to have a significant impact when 
both cross-sectional and within-country variation is taken into account, the oppo-
site holds true for the EU Agreement variable. This might indicate that the models 
fail to approximate satisfactorily for country-specific effects. The NATO-effect is 
however more than a pure time-effect since the models control for time-fixed ef-
fects common to all countries.  
The full model presented in Table 5 shows the results for FDI and aid inflows. 
While FDI is insignificant in all specification, our results seem to confirm a nega-
tive impact of aid found by other authors. Controlling for potential endogeneity 
problems, the significance of the negative impact shown in the POLS regressions 
disappear in the IV versions. However, there is a negative impact shown in our 
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fixed effects versions of the model. While this effect is not robust across all esti-
mated specifications it is plausible to assume that the level of aid flows does not 
have a positive impact on institutional performance as measured by the WBGI. 
One possible explanation for the absence of a positive impact of aid is that inflows 
of aid constitute an opportunity to relax fiscal control and to lower reform efforts 
in any country. However, since we do not include major recipients of aid flows, i.e. 
African countries, a far-reaching generalizations based on our sample are not war-
ranted.  
Another striking result is the significance of cultural proximity as shown by 
countries belonging to the group of countries sharing western Christianity as a cul-
tural feature of their societies. This is perhaps the most robust result over all speci-
fication which we tried (see also below). Of course, this adds to path-dependency 
as an important feature of institutional development. 
With respect to the economic variables, it is rather surprising that we do not 
find much significance regardless of the specification of the model or the regres-
sion method applied. There is one exception. Liberalization policies seem to mat-
ter. As was the case with aid, the IV regressions show that there may be endogene-
ity problems involved when regressions show significant results. Especially for 
economic liberalization it seems plausible to assume that a “reform shock” to insti-
tutional development might simultaneously affect liberalization policy. However, 
since liberalization is not very well predictable with its own lags, it might be that 
the different IV results are due to the additional prediction uncertainty. Focusing 
on the POLS and FE estimates, the results indicate that across countries as well as 
within countries economic liberalization leads to better governance over time. (We 
cannot see any systematic differences between the FE and POLS estimates). 
The political variables in the full model reveal some substantial path-
dependency. Looking at the incentive variables these are tensions at independence 
which seem to determine future institutional development negatively. There is 
only one case in which the turnover variable showing the involvement of democ-
ratic parties in government is weakly significant10. The resource variables seem to 
work slightly better. At least, fuel exports are shown to have a weakly significant 
negative effect on institution building as expected by the relevant literature on re-
source curse. More resources seem to be detrimental but different from aid this 
type of resources seems to matter more between countries than over time11. 
                                                 
10 This might, however, be caused by missing values in the turnover variable and therefore 
changes in the sample composition. 
11 However, this might be due to the lack of variation of resource exports within countries 
over time. 
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In Table 6, we present two sub-models because due to our limited data set and 
a quite substantial number of exogenous variables, significance of coefficients 
may suffer from a relatively low degree of freedom in the small sample. Hence, 
having potential misspecification in mind we have run economic and political 
models. The results are quite surprising. First, the results from the sub-models 
confirm the significance of the external impact variables, especially on EU acces-
sion and belonging to western community. Second, the economic and political 
blocks work strikingly better when excluding the alternative explanations. Look-
ing at the IV versions of the regressions, all variables from the economic block are 
significant. The significantly positive effect of higher inflation seems to lend sup-
port to the crisis argument by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), i.e. more instability 
may create a momentum for institutional reform. However, the growth variable 
points into the opposite direction. It shows that a better growth performance in-
duces better governance. This would be consistent with the findings of Paldam 
(2002) and Paldam and Gundlach (2008). With respect to politics, the significance 
of tensions and cohesion point to a considerable path-dependency while turnover 
indicates that a higher degree of involvement of democratic parties lead to better 
institutions. Fuel exports show the expected negative effect which is, however, 
weak in the IV version. Looking at resource endowment as a dummy variable does 
not reveal better results for the resource impact on governance. 
As has been argued above, restricting the model to either economic or political 
variables runs the risk of misspecification. Nevertheless, it provides a kind of 
overall robustness check to see that some variables remain significant when 
switching to the full model. In the last step, we deviated from the full model by 
presenting a reduced model which has only variables which worked in the full 
model either in its IV or in the fixed effects specification and independent of the 
EU variable included. This model is presented in Table 7. 
The variables which have been picked from the full model are the EU variables 
plus NATO, aid flows, western Christianity, economic liberalization, and tensions 
at independence. As can be seen in Table 7, the EU variables worked as before. 
The NATO variable provides strikingly good results in the specification using EU 
Basic and EU Potential variables. This seems to reflect the fact that basic agree-
ments with the EU and NATO both and independently of each other provide in-
centives for better governance while there is definitely something left to be ex-
plained for those countries which, in addition, have the chance of becoming full 
members of the EU. While western Christianity again provides significantly posi-
tive results through our all specification, the aid variable seem to be less robust. 
The same applies to tensions at independence which work well when economic 
liberalization is excluded but, overall, economic liberalization seems to provide a 
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robust and positive impact on institution building which is also confirmed when 
checked by IV regressions.  
 
 
5. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
 
All in all, our models confirm a positive impact of the EU on institutional 
change in European transition countries. However, different to Di Tommaso, 
Raiser and Weeks (2007) and Beck and Laeven (2006), we are able to show that 
both membership and accession matters and that there is an additional and inde-
pendent positive impact from NATO accession on institution building in transition 
countries. Other potential external drivers do not show a positive impact in our 
regressions while especially foreign aid may even create moral hazard problems. 
Differences between countries seem to matter less reflecting different absorption 
capacities while increases in aid flows over time have been found to impact nega-
tively on institutional quality. In line with the majority of previous empirical stud-
ies we did not find a significant impact of WTO membership. As opposed to other 
papers we are not able to detect a robust impact of trade flows. Among our prox-
imity variables, belonging to the community of western Christianity provided the 
most robust and positive effects.  
Among potential internal drivers, two determinants show the most robust im-
pact on institutions: economic liberalization as measured by the EBRD liberaliza-
tion indicator and tensions at independence. Clearly, economic reform matters not 
only for economic performance and for building of economic institutions as shown 
by Di Tommaso, Raiser and Weeks (2007) but for institutions measured on the 
basis of the comprehensive WBGI as well. At the same time, countries starting 
with unfavorable political conditions need more effort or external incentives for 
institution building.  
Hence, there is a considerable element of path-dependency. Clearly, countries 
belonging to the western community with respect to their cultural features, which 
could become EU members, and which do not suffer from political conflict at the 
start of the transition process have better starting conditions. In this respect, geog-
raphy matters. However, there are additional variables which impact on good gov-
ernance in any country in our sample: basic agreements with both the EU and 
NATO and economic liberalization matter most.  
All in all, the most important message of this paper is that even basic EU and 
NATO agreements can provide positive incentives for better governance. These 
are reasons for optimism: both institutions can have an impact below membership 
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incentives and basic incentives are available for, at least, most European transition 
countries. Whether or not the ENP can build on this depends on country specific 
action plans. However, it is the impact of NATO agreements which is most sur-
prising - at least at first sight - and desires further research. Beyond the EU, NATO 
may be able to trade (regional) security for development in a wider Europe. 
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C. Neighborhood Europeanization: 
Institutional Change under Weak 
Conditionality 
 
 
1. Mapping Institutional Development in the CIS: Comparative  
Statistics 
 
The empirical analysis in Section B revealed that internal and external drivers 
matter for explaining institutional change in the CIS. In our qualitative studies, we 
first concentrated on internal drivers by focusing on recent institutional changes in 
some countries of the CIS area, known as color revolutions (Melnykovska 2008). 
We explain the different trajectories followed by countries that launched color 
revolutions and those that remain authoritarian, contrasting revolutionary Ukraine 
with non-revolutionary Russia. We argue that both types of regime change came 
about for similar economic reasons, but had different implication for the political 
regimes, namely, that while the Orange Revolution is a discontinuous regime 
change, soft authoritarianism is a continuous one. Both reflect the preferences of 
the influential elite, i.e. business groups. The nature of political change depends 
upon the differences in characteristics within business groups, the availability of 
the oligarchic rents and the degree of implementation by which these preferences 
enter into Ukraine’s and Russia’s state politics.  
For the case of Ukraine, we show that rather weak top-down incentives of the 
ENP have to be well targeted at supporting bottom-up drivers of institutional 
change in transition countries (Melnykovska and Schweickert 2008). The argu-
ments by Havrylyshyn (2006) and Olson (2000) would imply that external influ-
ences could lead to changing preferences of domestic elites in favor of good gov-
ernance. The study shows that Ukraine is a case in point. The heterogeneous group 
of oligarchs initially blocked reforms but changed their economic and political 
preferences and became driving forces behind the regime change and implementa-
tion of reforms during and after the Orange Revolution which narrowed the insti-
tutional gap between Ukraine and the EU. However, bottom-up forces after having 
supported a first wave of reforms urgently have difficulties to sustain their coali-
tion. Strong business interests in good relations with the EU would provide the 
INSTITUTIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CIS TOWARDS EUROPEAN BENCHMARKS 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 82 31 
basis for rather weak but well-targeted ENP top-down incentives to make a differ-
ence. 
The fact that the ENP has to work in a much more indirect way implies that it 
is necessary to identify the main internal drivers and to look at proximity to the 
EU. While including the main categories used in the regression analysis, Table 8 
considers some additional variables as well as all four indicators on institutional 
development discussed in Section A. Table 8 is constructed by ranking all coun-
tries with respect to determinants of institutional change and showing the average 
level of institutional quality of country groups with similar characteristics accord-
ing to these determinants. Hence, it is to be expected that country groups with bet-
ter preconditions according to the determinants would show higher values of the 
standardized indicators on institutions shown in the columns on the right. 
Looking at initial conditions and endowment this seems generally to be the 
case. Especially the performance of the countries grouped according to the value 
of the Polity IV indicator for 1991 (Democracy at Independence) reveal that to-
day’s institutions are determined to a large extend by path-dependency. CIS coun-
tries with bad governance back in 1991 did not improve in relative terms since 
then. A negative deviation from this overall picture is provided by the group of 
CIS countries which had the best starting conditions (Armenia, Belarus, Russia, 
and Ukraine).  
Comparing the results for initial conditions according to human development 
and income (HDI, GNP) with those for political conditions, it seems to be evident 
that the Polity indicator and the WBGI indicator tell a somewhat different story 
compared to the other two indicators on institutional quality. Both Polity and 
WBGI sharply divide between CIS and non-CIS country groups, i.e. CIS country 
groups among themselves rank as is to be expected and the same is true for the EU 
countries but both rankings do not really fit together. At the same time, the differ-
ence in institutional quality is much more pronounced in the WBGI indicator 
which would be consistent with administrative and legal institutions performing 
much worse than political institutions. This is, however, not confirmed by the 
Heritage and EBRD indicators. They show a much more homogeneous picture for 
the ranking of all country groups. It is especially the Heritage indicator which does 
not point at generally lower levels of institutional quality in CIS countries. Here, 
especially the country groups including either Russia or Ukraine or both countries 
perform worse than what would be expected on the basis of initial conditions pre-
vailing in these countries.  
In the last row, net fuel exports are taken as an indicator for resource depend-
ence. This is of course a very crude. However, oil and gas resources are usually 
those which are related to resource rent arguments, i.e. the assumption that the 
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more resources a country has the more rent-seeking possibilities can be exploited 
which slows down the speed of institutional reform. However, the only indicator 
which to some extent supports this hypothesis is the Heritage indicator. This indi-
cator shows two groups of countries. A first group consists of the EU countries 
and the fuel producing and exporting countries, among them Russia. A second 
group of countries which either import fuel from Russia for own consumption like 
Ukraine or which imports fuel from Russia for re-exporting like Belarus perform 
worse. The Heritage indicator has the worst grades for the re-exporting group 
which, again, lends some support for an enhanced resource rent hypothesis claim-
ing that rents are related not only with exploitation but also with trading schemes. 
A second set of indicators analyzes the explanatory power of indicators on 
learning by experience during the process of transition. Informal institutions mat-
ter for transition because in the absence of formal institutions they considerably 
shaped what resulted in a patchwork of institutional outcomes. These effects are 
difficult to measure and we approximated them by using the indicator on corrup-
tion (Freedom House). The graphs show the progress and the level of this indicator.  
As was the case with initial conditions, the WBGI indicator seems to look at 
two different worlds – CIS and non-CIS – and to rank countries as expected but 
only within these two subgroups. The Polity indicator for institutional quality pro-
vides rather unsystematic evidence. Again, the economic indicators Herall and 
EBRDinst provide more plausible results. Taking, e.g., the EBRD index and ex-
cluding the Baltic countries with exceptionally good values, the graphs show an 
almost perfect negative correlation between corruption on the one hand and the 
quality of institutions on the other hand.  
The last set of determinants has the picture with respect to geography and lib-
eralization policy explaining institutional quality. Here again, a comparison of CIS 
and EU countries is almost impossible on the basis of the WBGI. However, the 
explanation of proximity to the EU either measured by the share of EU-Trade, 
shared borders with the EU or distance of capitals to Brussels work quite well as 
an explanation for institutional quality in CIS countries. This lends some support 
to the hypothesis that importing formal institutions mattered considerably for the 
CIS transition countries. An interesting result is provided in the case that institu-
tional quality is measured by the EBRDinst index. In this case, the graphs show a 
perfect correlation which is not the case when institutional quality measured by the 
EBRDinst index is explained by liberalization – not exclusively but prominently 
of trade - measured by the EBRDlib index. This may be due to a bias of the 
EBRDinst index in favour of nearby countries. However, it also fits to the results 
from the other indicators which reveal that especially for one group of countries – 
Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova – liberalization policies did 
not show the expected pay offs in terms of institutional development.  
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As was said above, this is meant to provide a first approximation with respect 
to explanations for different institutional performance of CIS countries. All in all, 
it showed that initial conditions, endowments, learning processes, geography, and 
policy to some extent explain differences between country groups. At the same 
time, explanations are not perfect so they leave room for a country specific view 
and a more detailed introduction to a potential influence by the ENP. 
Table 8 also contains some interesting information about institutional devel-
opment and its determinants for our case studies. According to the WBGIall indi-
cator, Ukraine and Georgia provide a similar level of institutional development 
which is higher than the level of institutional development in Azerbaijan and Rus-
sia. As can be inferred from Table 9, these similarities and differences are re-
flected by the classification of the countries with respect to the determinants of 
institutional development. Ukraine and Georgia are close to each other with re-
spect to three out of four indicators in the category Geography, Trade and Policy 
(Volume of Trade, Borders, Distance) and found themselves in the same groups 
concerning three out of four indicators in the category Initial Conditions and En-
dowment (HDI, GNP, Fuel exports). In the same vein, Russia and Azerbaijan are 
in the same country groups concerning Resource Dependency and Liberalization.  
The other three indicators of institutional development show a different picture 
concerning the relative position of the four countries. Here, Ukraine and Russia 
reveal a comparable level of institutions development. This is consistent with the 
categorization of the two countries concerning the indicator on Learning by Doing 
as well as on some indicators in the two other categories of determinants (Democ-
racy at Independence, Liberalization, Borders and Distance). Hence, different in-
dicators seem to tell slightly different stories about institutional development in 
CIS countries. Additionally, some explanatory variables are more consistent with 
the picture shown by one institutional indicator while other explanatory variables 
seem to fit better with institutions measured by the other institutional indicators.  
This also applies to development of the indicators since the early-1990s and 
economic performance during transition (Figure 2):  
• As a common feature all CIS countries faced a transition crisis and had to 
built institutions from scratch; 
• Then institutional performance improved along a return of economic 
growth rates to normal after a deep crisis; 
• Expect for Azerbaijan, the sample countries faced a standstill or setback 
of institutional development combined with some economic crises after 
initial improvement which may be labeled second wave of institution 
building; 
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• Azerbaijan did not face any kind of significant economic crisis and, re-
cently, experiences acceleration of growth rates due to resource exploita-
tion; 
• Comparing the four indicators of institutional development, it is obvious 
that they reveal quite different paths of institution building in the four 
countries; 
• Azerbaijan is again an exception with a continuous decline of the Polity 
IV indicator while the economic indicators and the WBGI indicator, the 
latter including economic aspects, improved. 
• The EBRD indicator tends to reveal a rather continuous development of 
institutions (except for the setback in the case of Russia) which may sup-
port the argument that this indicator is biased towards what the targets of 
the EBRD in these countries have been; 
• The WBGI show a cyclical development around a minor positive trend (if 
any) while the Heritage index has the cycles in different years and leads to 
the conclusion that institutions improved strongly over the observation pe-
riod. 
• Russia is the only country for which even the Heritage index does not 
show any improvement since the mid-1990s. 
Table 10 shows the level of governance measured by the WBGI as the most 
comprehensive governance indicators, thereby grouping the transition countries 
according to their level of cooperation with the EU. The lower level of cooperation 
with the EU or NATO, the worse institutions are. Croatia is the only exception 
from this rule. It scores even better than the EU new members Romania and Bul-
garia. While Ukraine overperformes in the indicator of voice and accountability, 
Georgia holds the leading positions on economic administrative and legal institu-
tions. Georgia also overperforms in the indicators of government effectiveness and 
control of corruption. Evidently, the color revolutions have not brought the com-
mon path of institution building. The external impulse of the ENP to improve the 
governance quality does not work for Azerbaijan. It has the lowest level of institu-
tions among ENP countries (even lower then Russia). Applying the ‘paradox of 
plenty’ approach, his result could be explained with the high resource rents mod-
erating both external and domestic demand for better institutions.  
All in all, this picture is consistent with some hypotheses concerning institution 
building in CIS countries. First, there is no evidence that major improvements of 
political institutions preceded the development of economic institutions. In the 
case of Azerbaijan, economic institutions improved although political institutions 
deteriorated. Second, the optimism about building up economic institutions have 
to be qualified due to potential biases of the EBRD indicator – due to the involve-
INSTITUTIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CIS TOWARDS EUROPEAN BENCHMARKS 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 82 35 
ment of the bank in transition processes – and the Heritage index – due to an ideo-
logical bias honoring any development towards a market economy. Third, with 
some good will one may detect a positive or above trend development of institu-
tions which is different for the two countries captured by the ENP, i.e. Ukraine and 
Georgia, but, recently, at least some of the indicators show a standstill or setback. 
Whether these developments are due to any involvement or non-involvement of 
the EU – as supported by the comparison of the country groups above – is not that 
obvious and has to be revealed by the country studies. 
 
 
2. Comparative Country Studies ─ Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan  
 
Comparing Ukraine to other ENP countries, Azerbaijan and Georgia, we de-
veloped an analytical framework distinguishing between democracy oriented Eu-
ropeanization on the one side and sectoral i.e. policy oriented Europeanization on 
the other side. We believe that the ENP has in both areas different potentials. The 
main point in our analysis is that the ENP lacks strong mechanisms of condition-
ality – in contrast to EU enlargements processes. As weak forms of conditionality 
refer only to sectoral integration (e.g. access to internal market with the conse-
quent benefiting from four freedoms of EU’s single economic space), democrati-
zation incentives are far weaker. 
Yet, until today, interpretations in the field of democracy promotion in the ENP 
are varying: “The Union seems quite satisfied with the ‘soft’ way in which the 
ENP promotes values. However, it has not been possible to reach a preference 
equilibrium with the ENP partners, given theirs view that the EU’s promotion of 
values is unsatisfactory” (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008, 91). Understandably, 
the “main accusations that the EU is biased…in this area stem from NGOs work-
ing in or with ENP partner countries” (ibid.). Naturally, we can expect that the 
respective non- or weak democratic states would not feel that deficit. Thus, it is 
necessary to regard both, the bottom-up and top-down perspective of democracy 
oriented Europeanization: 
Top down democratization: democracy promotion directed to leadership. Be-
cause of the lack of conditionality, the most important instrument, the EU covers 
in the field of democracy promotion is (apart from informal or secret diplomacy, 
which we might not get information about), political rhetoric or official diplomacy 
towards ENP states, which would be expressed through declarations or demarches 
(Maier and Schimmelfennig 2007, reference to Smith 2001). In the context of 
compliance analysis, this would be called strategy of “blaming and shaming” (see 
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for this e.g. Zangl 2001). As democratic deficits are not easy to measure in all ar-
eas, we concentrate on the most essential part of each liberal democracy: the elec-
tions. 
Bottom-up democratization: democracy promotion directed to non-state civil 
society actors. Here, we consider three transmission channels. First, we compare 
the support to civil society groups, as bottom-up support to democracy is a very 
widespread field of multilateral and bilateral contacts and financing. Second, in 
our analysis we include financial support in the field of education. For this we take 
a closer look on the TEMPUS programme (Trans-European mobility scheme for 
university studies). Third, in ENP rhetoric and in several action plans, freedom of 
media is an essential part of supporting democracy in these states. In our case stud-
ies, we observe different developments of media space. All of the countries still 
face the need of further development of independent media. Regarding a well 
working media sector as essential for democracy, we analyze the projects directed 
to support media in our three countries of case studies. 
In addition to democratization, the ENP includes a broad variety of sectoral in-
tegration areas in the APs with the partner states. In our analysis, we include 
those areas which help to understand the level of Europeanization of the regimes 
in Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan. We focus on those elements that hint on core 
areas of good governance, economic cooperation dimension and the Justice and 
Home-Affairs dimension, in order to understand the proximity of these states to the 
EU. For analyzing these two policy areas we use six parameters: clarity of de-
mands, level of rewards, level of EU’s support, forms of linkage, degree of affect-
ing sovereignty, and local perception of demands. 
Preliminary findings show that the role of Ukraine in the ENP is paradigmatic 
for the overall ENP. Ukraine shows the strongest will of going beyond the ENP 
and reaching EU membership and is therefore ambitious to fulfill ENP require-
ments at a high level. Furthermore, its relation to the ENP is ambivalent, as most 
of Ukraine elite do not accept the missing membership opportunity in the ENP. 
Before 2004, the convergence of institutions towards EU standards was pri-
mary home-driven and minimal as well. This was due to disinterest of both the EU 
and Ukraine’s leadership. The ENP revealed the positive changes in EU priorities 
in the CIS, but without reform catalyst – an accession perspective – had little 
chances for success, unless a neighboring country began to converge towards EU 
standards on its own. The Orange Revolution largely driven by domestic forces 
marked the momentum for institutional reforms, even through not so fast and so 
comprehensive as expected by those who overestimated the “colorful” upheaval at 
the end of 2004.  
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Either orange or blue-and-white political groups are striving for close coopera-
tion with the EU. However, under circumstances where the EU’s membership for 
Ukraine is off agenda, there are a few small incentives for the divergent political 
groups to unite around the institutional convergence. Engaged in the power strug-
gles, the Ukrainian leadership has little room for implementation of EU-style re-
forms. 
Indeed, it has not been the Ukrainian leadership that drives the implementation 
of the AP priorities, but business groups and “EU-oriented” enclaves in the 
Ukrainian bureaucracy. The Ukrainian business groups, integrated into global 
markets, have used their influence on government politics to push the institutional 
convergence towards EU standards. However, this convergence takes place ac-
cording to the costs-benefits calculations of the business groups and is not equally 
far-reaching in all spheres, but progressing in the economic sphere in particular. 
The convergence is also supported by the “bureaucratic enclaves” that successfully 
enforce reforms implementation. Remarkably, there are no opponents to the EU 
integration among domestic actors, but no active actions from the side of the pro-
ponents, too. This passivity is the reaction of the “vague” EU incentives and mod-
erate or non-appropriate EU assistance. 
Democracy promotion as the relatively new priority of the ENP in comparison 
with the PCA priorities becomes fruitful only after Ukraine begins to democratize 
on its own. However, the power struggle between the various branches of govern-
ment and usage of the constitution-conflicting tools in these struggles hamper the 
effectiveness of the EU top-down mechanisms of democracy promotion. Thus, 
democracy promotion via the ENP seems to be more substantial in the terms of 
bottom-up mechanisms. 
Due to the attractiveness of EU markets for the Ukrainian exporters as well as 
the large share of EU imports in the Ukrainian markets, the cooperation and re-
spectively institutional convergence in the economic sphere are most successful. 
In the aftermath of the enlargement, the EU becomes keen on legal harmoniza-
tion to secure its external borders. Comparing to the PCA, the AP reveals a pro-
gress on legal harmonization, as far as it broadens the areas of approximation. Of-
ficially, the key priorities of JHA cooperation with the EU included the strengthen-
ing of the rule of law, and of administrative and judiciary capacity, migration and 
border management, money laundering, trafficking in human beings, drugs and 
corruption. Practically, the primary objective was to acquire the support of the 
EU's neighbors in minimizing risks related to different kinds of cross-border crime 
that threaten EU stability and security. Nevertheless, the far-reaching legal har-
monization, especially in cross-border cooperation and illegal migration policies, 
despite of vague formulations of “common values”, reflects an anticipated behav-
Rainer Schweickert, Inna Melnykovska, Andrea Gawrich, Thorsten Drautzburg 
 
CASE Network Reports No. 82 38 
iour of the Ukrainian authorities and expectations of further incentives from the 
EU (similar to the facilitation of visa regime). 
Yet, the EU still has the potential to carry forward and speed up the institu-
tional change in Ukraine. The clarity on the future level and deepness of EU-
Ukraine relationship would (if positive) unified the Ukrainian political elite and 
end the political crises. It would promote the come-back of positive attitudes to the 
EU among the population, currently disappointed with EU unwillingness to recog-
nize its European aspirations and suffering from the new “curtains” of Schengen 
zone. Besides the EU, the convergence towards European values could be sup-
ported by intensifying Ukraine’s cooperation or integration into other international 
organization with requirements on institution-building. Due to the growing impor-
tance of regional security, NATO becomes a significant external driver. Hence, the 
Ukrainian leadership is striving for the closer relationships with NATO and is 
ready to undertake commitments – to some part also on institutional quality - 
within the NATO Membership Action Plan. 
In Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze took over power in 1992. Inner dispute was 
eased, while ethnic violence reached a peak. The outburst of ethno-political wars 
with the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the closing of 
almost all industrial facilities lead to an economic collapse of the young state. 
Both conflicts have remained unsolved until the resent clash between Gerogia and 
Russia and were hardly protected by ceasefire agreements. Georgia, meanwhile, 
seeked to establish a functioning and by-all recognized statehood. 
By 2003, however, the situation grew unbearable. Widespread electoral fraud 
during the parliamentary elections in November 2003 led to what is today widely 
known as the so-called Rose Revolution. With the election of Mikhail Saakashvili 
as new President of Georgia, and parliamentary elections shortly after, Georgia 
experienced a change of power, and fundamental changes in domestic and foreign 
policies. Saakashvili’s government initiated an ambitious policy of reforms, with a 
strong focus on bringing down corruption and facilitating democratic structures, 
rule of law, good governance and the introduction of a market economy. And in-
deed, Georgia’s economy has impressively grown during the last years. The resto-
ration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, however, became top priority, and has en-
trapped Georgia already to several rather risky and impatient moves. Those moves, 
however, result also from the fact that the ongoing conflicts with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are obstacles for Georgia’s ambitions to bring the country closer to 
EU and NATO membership. 
Georgia experienced a significant reform in political, economic and social 
spheres since the change of regime in 2003. The first visible change was the radi-
cal police reform. Especially the corrupt traffic police which had entirely lived on 
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discretionary charged fees disappeared from one day on the other. However, a lot 
yet needs to be done. Similarly to Azerbaijan, the party system remains weak, 
politics continue to be strongly politicized and the family or clan-oriented clan 
structure has practically remained. Like his predecessors President Saakashvili has 
taken over the role of the people’s “patron” (Reisner 2006:11) while a comprehen-
sive change of traditional perceptions and mentality within Georgia’s society, 
though overdue, still has not been implemented. Persisting economic hardship 
which led to excessive migration continues to focus people on everyday survival 
rather than on revising positions, e.g., towards the countries minority groups. 
The peaceful settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts (the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict), is the priority area in the EU-Georgian relations. Despite that 
until today the EU has shirked any responsibility for the ethno-political conflicts – 
the key problem of the entire South Caucasus region. The sole case of direct EU 
involvement concerns its financial support to the Joint Control Commission in 
South Ossetia via its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which is 
marginal right now due to unwillingness of the parties to further cooperate with 
each other (Koenig 2004). Traditionally the EU regards the work on conflict pre-
vention to be more efficient than post-conflict management. The EU has always 
preferred to retain a low overall profile leaving the mediation process to other ex-
ternal actors. A consistent strategy for the South Caucasus is missing. One reason 
is that the EU needs to seek constructive dialogue with Russia. This will only be 
possible when Russia sees the EU not as a competitor in the Black Sea region, but 
as a co-operative partner. 
The EU’s hesitative engagement in the conflict resolution processes negatively 
affects EU-Georgian relations. Saakashvili’s Georgia repeatedly claims for 
stronger international engagement, and for the deployment of international peace-
keeping forces in the regions of the conflict. However, their claims have remained 
unheard until now leading to growing frustration and increasing unwillingness to 
further co-operate with the EU in certain issues and to further support single EU 
activities in the regions of the conflict. 
In comparison to the other case studies – Ukraine and Georgia – no second 
transition in a form of color revolution happened in Azerbaijan. In terms of do-
mestic political reforms, Azerbaijan belongs to the group of passive partners and 
seems to be reluctant to fulfill the EU’s demands for democratization. In contrast 
to Ukraine and Georgia, obvious interest has advanced mostly from EU-side, 
rather than from the Azerbaijani government. 
Instead of pushing for democratic election standards by using the means of 
specific sanction mechanisms, the EU seems to be more interested in stable politi-
cal environment, which enables a reliable energy policy. The Ukrainian experience 
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seems to leave a bitter aftertaste in that matter. Therefore the Azerbaijani leader-
ship views it as the correct strategic choice to regard the energy security issue as 
much more important for the EU. They anticipate the EU would not mind the lack 
of reform steps as long as all agreements concerning energy issues are imple-
mented (Babayev 2007). This request is encouraged because the ENP and the AP 
mechanisms for democracy promotion do not envisage any sanctions or incentives 
for (non-)compliance.  
Since accepting the formal commitments for democracy and rule of law in the 
framework of the Council of Europe (CoE) accession in 2001 Azerbaijan has 
shown no noteworthy reform ambitions. Undoubtedly, the content of the reform 
demands is clear. The EU, the CoE and especially the OSCE/ODIHR have ex-
pressed demands for democratic elections. But because of the lack of sanctions 
and rewards, elite behavior will not be altered. The European Commission referred 
to the elections in 2005 as “democratic litmus test”. Although these elections 
failed to comply with democratic standards no sanctions followed. Instead, the 
Action Plan and a special Memorandum concerning the most important issue (en-
ergy cooperation) have been signed. The socialization and intended “learning 
process” in Azerbaijan will not be achieved by a hypocritical behavior of the EU 
and other international actors. The general emphasis in the AP is to be interpreted 
remotely and can rather be seen as a product „from the EU’s desire to address its 
own internal security problems related to cross-border crime and border manage-
ment“ (Occipinti 2007: 120). In comparison to Ukraine and Georgia, in case of 
Azerbaijan the energy policy is of the greatest importance within ENP mecha-
nisms.  
 
 
3. Summary and Policy Conclusions – Hypotheses on ENP  
Europeanization 
 
ENP as a catalyst but not the main driver of Europeanization: Regarding 
the first results of our case studies, we assume that the role of the domestic situa-
tion is predominant for the pace and degree of Europeanization. Our three case 
studies show that a certain stage of willingness and domestic motivation for insti-
tutional reform in the direction of Good Governance, Democracy and Europeani-
zation is an important pre-condition for implementing the ENP. Progress in 
Ukraine and Georgia concerning the ENP are first and foremost a consequence of 
the home-driven dynamic for reform, the willingness of the elites. Without the 
color revolutions, this progress could not have been expected. We conclude that 
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the ENP may work as a catalyst, but not a basic mechanism of Europeanization. 
Our counter-example is Azerbaijan, which lacked domestic movement in favor of 
“second transitions”. Here, implementation of the ENP remains half-hearted by the 
ruling elites and is based on cost-benefit calculations. 
Internal market access as top-incentive for Ukraine only: Regarding the 
prospects of EU-integration, the access to EU’s internal market is of most impor-
tance. For the moment it is a realistic perspective only for Ukraine and Moldova. 
The access to all four freedoms of the single EU economic space is even a more 
future dream. If we regard the internal-market-access as the most powerful incen-
tive of the ENP today, we have to consider that currently there is a sharp segrega-
tion between ENP countries: those with realistic perspective for single market in-
tegration (Ukraine, Moldova) and those without (all other participants of the ENP). 
This is the most important difference with the EU enlargement process because 
being an accession country included a rather clear (and comparably timely) per-
spective of the final incentive – the membership. Furthermore, according to Euro-
peanization theories the prospects of compliance are negative if incentives for be-
ing compliant are offered too far in future. 
Weak Conflict resolution: Without analyzing the individual challenges in 
each of the ENP states, it is not possible to understand prospects of Europeaniza-
tion in a thorough way. We identified conflict resolution as being one area with an 
overall influence on cooperation or non-cooperation. These are the important na-
tional conflicts, which affect both Georgia (Georgian-Abkhazian conflict) and 
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia), both regarded as the so 
called frozen conflicts. Priorities of conflict resolution can be found in both APs, 
yet EU’s engagement is very often regarded as of minor relevance. Concerning 
both countries, the EU is playing a rather minor role in conflict resolution and dif-
ferent forms of calculated passiveness can be observed. In Azerbaijan, we have the 
importance of energy relations instead. In case of Georgia the EU does not want to 
confront Russian interests in that region too much. This has negative influence on 
Europeanization, which must be taken into account in the overall evaluation of 
ENP cooperation framework. 
Energy relations and EU’ interest: As mentioned above, we cannot under-
stand EU’s strategy in the ENP correctly without regarding the obvious energy 
interests, which EU has in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Azerbaijan is one target coun-
try of the EU’s ambition to weaken energy dependence from Russia, whereas 
Ukraine is the most important transit country for Russian energy, delivered to EU. 
We argue that the importance of Russia in EU’s energy policy affects the ENP like 
a huge shadow.  
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EU security first: A lot of scholars have been hinting on this fact already: It is 
a public secret, which has been proven in our case studies as well: ENP’s border 
management component, i.e. the strategies and demands coping with better gov-
ernance of the border regimes of Eastern European states, focuses, first and fore-
most, on EU own security interest. We still have to closer investigate the conse-
quences of this priority for the implementation of EU’s border policy demands. 
For sure, ENP participants are aware of this EU strategy and the relevance of their 
own interests. 
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Table 2. Institutional Quality in the CIS 
Institutional 
Quality CODE 
Institutions 
average 
POLITY 
2003 
Herall 
2007 
WBGIall 
2006 
EBRDinst 
2007 
high – – – – – – 
EST 0.74 0.93 0.72 0.65 0.65 
LTU 0.75 1.00 0.72 0.64 0.64 
EU Baltic 0.74 0.93 0.72 0.65 0.65 
LVA 0.71 0.90 0.68 0.64 0.61 
medium high 
BGR 0.66 0.95 0.62 0.54 0.52 
NMS 0.64 0.91 0.62 0.52 0.51 
ROU 0.63 0.90 0.61 0.52 0.50 
ARM 0.56 0.75 0.69 0.43 0.36 
UKR 0.55 0.85 0.53 0.41 0.41 
MDA 0.56 0.90 0.59 0.39 0.36 
GEO 0.54 0.75 0.69 0.42 0.32 
RUS 0.55 0.85 0.54 0.36 0.43 
medium 
CIS 0.48 0.66 0.54 0.35 0.37 
KGZ 0.39 0.35 0.60 0.31 0.30 
KAZ 0.39 0.20 0.60 0.38 0.39 
TJK 0.35 0.35 0.57 0.28 0.18 
medium low 
AZE 0.33 0.15 0.55 0.33 0.27 
BLR 0.28 0.15 0.47 0.29 0.20 
UZB 0.24 0.05 0.53 0.19 0.21 low 
TKM 0.17 0.05 0.43 0.21 0.00 
Source: World Bank, Polity Database, Heritage Foundation, EBRD. 
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Table 3. Chronology of EU, NATO, and WTO Accession 
EU WTO NATO 
Group Country Member 
Accession 
negotiations 
end 
Accession 
negotiations 
begin 
Strong 
notice on 
member-
ship 
EA/ 
EAAP*/
SAA 
signed 
weak 
notice on 
member-
ship 
ENPAP/
4CS/EA 
agreed 
PCA/ 
CA in 
force 
PCA/ 
CA 
signed 
GATT 
WTO 
member
Member
МAP/ 
Official 
invitation
Czech 
Republic 2004 2002 1998 1997 1995 1993 1991   1947 1999 1997 
Estonia 2004 2002 1998 1997 1995 1993    1999 2004 1999 
Hungary 2004 2002 1998 1997 1995 1993 1991   1973 1999 1997 
Latvia 2M4 2002 2000 1997 1995 1993    1999 2004 1999 
Lithuania 2004 2002 2000 1997 1995 1993    2001 2004 1999 
Poland 2004 2002 1998 1997 1995 1993 1991   1967 1999 1997 
Slovak 
Republic 2004 2002 2000 1997 1995 1993 1991   1947 2004 1999 
EU Members 
2004 
Slovenia 2004 2002 1998 1997 1996 1993  1993 1993 1994 2004 1999 
Bulgaria 2007 2004 2000 1997 1995 1993 1993   1996 2004 1999 EU Members 
2007 Romania 2007 2004 2000 1997 1995 1993 1993   1971 2004 1999 
Albania    2003 2006*** 2000  1992 1992 2000  1999 
Croatia   2005 2303 2001 2000    2000  2002 Balkans 
Macedonia    2003 2001 2000  1998 1997 2003  1999 
Moldova       2005 1998 1994 2001   EU East 
Neighbors Ukraine       2005 1998 1994 2008   
Armenia       2006 1999 1996 2003   
Azerbaijan       2006 1999 1996    Southern Caucasus 
Georgia       2006 1999 1996 2000   
Russia       2003 1997 1994    EU North East 
Neighbors Belarus        ** 1995    
Kazakhstan        1999 1995    
Kyrgyz 
Republic        1999 1995 1998   
Tajikistan        *** 2004    
Turkmeni-
stan        **** 1998    
Central Asia 
Uzbekistan        1999 1999    
Notes: * European Agreements signed in 1991 with Poland, Hungary and CSFR did not involve any membership perspective and, therefore, could not be 
evaluated in the same way as European Agreements signed after 1993. European Agreements of 1991 were updated in 1995 with Europe Agreement Addi-
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tional Protocol that includes membership perspective. — ** PCA was ratified by Belarus 04/05/1995, ratification not completed by EU. — *** PCA was 
ratified by Tajikistan 06/12/2005, ratification not completed by EU. — **** PCA was ratified by Turkmenistan 11/02/2004, ratification not completed by 
EU. — ***** SAA with Albania was signed in 2006. 
Sources: EU Agreements Database (http://europa.eu/abc/history/1990-1999/index_en.htm; own summary);  
WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm ); NATO (www.nato.int; http://www.bits.de/frames/databasesd.htm ) 
Definitions: 
PCA: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement;  
CA: The Cooperation Agreement; 
ENPAP: The European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan; 
4CS: The Four Common Spaces; 
EA: Europe Agreement;  
EAAP: Europe Agreement Additional Protocol;  
SAA: The Stabilization and Association Agreement;  
MAP: Membership Action Plan. 
‘weak notice on membership’: The Copenhagen Summit of 1993 for countries that became EU Members until 2007 or the Zagreb Summit of 2000 for 
Western Balkans. 
‘strong notice on membership’: the Luxembourg Summit of 1997 for Central and East European countries or the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 for Western 
Balkans. 
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Table 4. Exogenous Variables Used in the Regressions  
Variable Description Source 
Dependent Variable     
WBGI Arithmetic average of the six WBGI sub-
indices 
WBGI; 
http://www.govindicat
ors.org 
External drivers     
Membership     
EU Accession Time varying variable measuring the  degree 
of association with the EU on a basis of 
agreements as PCA, SAA or ENP AP. 
Running from 0 = no agreements to 5 = 
membership. 
EU Agreement 
Database 
EU Basic Dummy Variable, equals 1 for "potential 
members" if SAA ratified in the previous year 
or for other countries if PCA in force since 
previous year. 
EU Agreement 
Database 
EU Potential Time-invariant dummy; equals 1 for all 
countries except Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
EU; 
http://europa.eu/abc/hi
story/1990-
1999/index_en.htm 
NATO Dummy variable equals 1 for all years follow-
ing a membership action plan. 
NATO; www.nato.int; 
Berlin Information 
Center for Transatlan-
tic Security; 
http://www.bits.de/fra
mes/databasesd.htm 
WTO Dummy variable equals 1 for all years follow-
ing WTO or GATT accession. 
WTO; 
http://www.wto.org/en
glish/thewto_e/acc_e/c
ompleteacc_e.htm 
Economic Relations     
FDI Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows 
(Share of GDP), average over current and past 
two years. 
World Bank: World 
Development Indica-
tors Online 
AID Official Development Assistance and Official 
Aid (Share of GDP), average over current and 
past two years. 
World Bank: World 
Development Indica-
tors Online 
EXPORTS share of exports to non-transition countries, 
average over current and past two years in % 
of world exports. 
Directions of Trade, 
IMF (2006) 
Distance     
WESTERN Dominance of protestant or catholic Christi-
anity (=1, otherwise 0). 
CIA World; 
https://www.cia.gov/li
brary/publications/the-
world-factbook/ 
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Continue Table 4. 
Variable Description Source 
Internal drivers   
Economics     
Economic Policy     
LIBERALIZATION Average of price liberalization and trade and 
foreign exchange liberalization, running from 
1 to 4,66. 
EBRD; 
http://www.ebrd.com/
country/sector/econo/s
tats/tic.xls 
INFLATION Inflation, consumer prices (annual %), geo-
metric average over current and past two 
years. 
World Bank: World 
Development Indica-
tors Online and, if 
missing, EBRD 
Economic Performance 
INCOME GDP per capita at PPP divided by initial GDP 
per capita, normal ppp. 
World Bank: World 
Development Indica-
tors Online 
GROWTH growth GDP, geometric average over current 
and past two years. 
World Bank: World 
Development Indica-
tors Online 
Politics     
Incentives     
TENSIONS Binary variable: conflict yes or not. Heidelberger Institute 
für Internationale 
Konfliktforschung; 
http://www.hiik.de/sta
rt/index.html 
TURNOVER Dummy variable, indicates if communist 
party or successor party is in government, 
0=comm; 0,5=comm influence; 1= non 
comm; na=not clear. 
EIU Country Profiles; 
www.eiu.com 
COHESION (absolute value of largest non communist 
party vote) - (ex KP vote in first post-
transition election). 
EBRD Transition 
Report (1999) 
Opportunities (Resources)   
ENDOWMENT Resource reserves, dummy variable, rich=2, 
moderate=1, poor=0. 
de Melo (2001); Auty 
(2006) 
FUEL EXPORTS WDI - Fuel exports (% of merchandise 
exports) 
World Bank: World 
Development Indica-
tors Online 
METAL EXPORTS WDI - Ores and metals exports (% of mer-
chandise exports) 
World Bank: World 
Development Indica-
tors Online 
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Table 5. Aggregate Results and Comparative EU-Indicators 
 IV OLS FE IV OLS FE IV OLS FE 
EU Agreement 1,035* 0,617* -0,005 0,648* 0,498*** -0,005    
  (1,75) (1,72) (0,02) (1,83) (3,02) (0,02)     
EU Potential -1,089 -0,405     1,789** 1,277***  
  (1,02) (0,42)     (2,17) (2,85)  
EU Basic       2,415*** 1,223*** 0,928*** 
        (2,98) (3,71) (2,87) 
NATO 1,051 1,017*** 1,431*** 1,263* 1,024*** 1,431*** 3,463*** 1,364*** 1,410*** 
  (1,32) (3,24) (4,73) (1,67) (3,22) (4,73) (3,10) (3,85) (4,86) 
WTO -0,676 -0,019 0,084 -0,418 0,057 0,084 -1,360 -0,132 -0,386 
  (0,98) (0,04) (0,24) (0,70) (0,14) (0,24) (1,34) (0,32) (0,90) 
           
FDI -0,027 0,000 -0,010 -0,040 -0,002 -0,010 -0,058 0,004 -0,003 
  (0,77) (0,03) (0,66) (1,20) (0,13) (0,66) (1,11) (0,30) (0,22) 
AID -0,108 -0,201*** -0,270** -0,163 -0,216*** -0,270** 0,035 -0,172*** -0,287*** 
  (0,72) (2,86) (2,43) (1,33) (3,62) (2,43) (0,27) (3,03) (3,95) 
           
WESTERN 3,790*** 3,839***  4,248*** 4,015*** 0,000 5,270*** 3,901***  
  (3,90) (5,13)  (5,45) (6,36)  (5,44) (6,24)  
           
LIBERALIZATION 1,291 1,376*** 1,188** 1,285 1,322*** 1,188** -0,544 0,934*** 0,734** 
  (1,28) (3,48) (2,18) (1,41) (3,27) (2,18) (0,39) (2,90) (2,07) 
GROWTH 0,226 -0,106 0,264 -0,677 -0,397 0,264 -1,445 0,067 0,347 
  (0,21) (0,14) (0,14) (0,83) (0,69) (0,14) (1,23) (0,10) (0,22) 
INCOME 0,000 0,000  0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000 -0,000  
  (0,49) (0,18)  (0,19) (0,08)  (0,15) (0,15)  
INFLATION 0,020 0,026 -0,098 -0,006 0,013 -0,098 -0,282 -0,095 -0,062 
  (0,08) (0,15) (0,75) (0,02) (0,07) (0,75) (0,89) (0,47) (0,37) 
           
TENSIONS -1,522*** -1,617***  -1,685*** -1,655*** 0,000 -2,317*** -1,867***  
  (4,37) (6,65)  (5,48) (6,94)  (4,93) (6,49)  
RIGHTS 0,046 -0,006  0,067 0,007 0,000 0,133 -0,056  
  (0,22) (0,04)  (0,37) (0,04)  (0,66) (0,36)  
TURNOVER 0,383 0,482 0,105 0,469 0,527* 0,105 0,400 0,526 1,078 
  (1,02) (1,55) (0,21) (1,47) (1,80) (0,21) (0,83) (1,58) (1,39) 
COHESION 0,552 0,544*  0,565 0,542 0,000 0,651 0,590  
  (1,56) (1,68)  (1,63) (1,66)  (1,24) (1,63)  
FUEL EXPORTS -0,012* -0,016** -0,019 -0,007 -0,014** -0,019 -0,012 -0,021*** -0,004 
  (1,71) (2,57) (1,01) (0,98) (2,40) (1,01) (0,90) (3,43) (0,19) 
METAL EXPORTS -0,045 -0,051** -0,009 -0,048 -0,050** -0,009 -0,043 -0,057** 0,037 
  (1,10) (2,09) (0,24) (1,25) (2,04) (0,24) (0,81) (1,99 )  (0,80 )  
          
R-squared 0,97 0,97 0,62 0,97 0,97 0,62 0,93 0,96 0,57 
adj R-squared 0,96 0,97 0,54 0,96 0,97 0,54 0,91 0,95 0,50 
Observations 103,00 103,00 103,00 103,00 103,00 103,00 113,00 113,00 113,00 
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Table 6. Economic vs. Political Determinants 
 IV OLS IV OLS 
EU Agreement 1,522*** 1,370*** 0,943*** 0,965*** 
  (6,05) (6,23) (2,65) (3,16) 
EU Potential -1,664** -1,960*** 0,102 -0,201 
  (2,39) (2,91) (0,12) (0,22) 
EU Basic     
      
NATO -0,718 0,343 0,323 0,734** 
  (1,03) (0,98) (0,51) (2,24) 
WTO -0,299 0,136 0,248 0,029 
  (0,61) (0,47) (0,35) (0,07) 
      
FDI -0,004 -0,015 0,019 0,039** 
  (0,11) (1,11) (0,88) (2,48) 
AID -0,007 0,005 -0,073 -0,077* 
  (0,11) (0,13) (1,30) (1,81) 
      
WESTERN 2,936*** 3,086*** 4,071*** 4,100*** 
  (7,86) (8,82) (7,60) (7,45) 
      
LIBERALIZATION 1,862*** 1,348***   
  (4,65) (6,03)   
GROWTH 2,201*** 1,808***   
  (4,19) (3,63)   
INCOME 0,000*** 0,000***   
  (2,67) (3,16)   
INFLATION 0,385** 0,204*   
  (2,25) (1,87)   
      
TENSIONS   -1,513*** -1,546*** 
    (7,07) (6,99) 
RIGHTS   -0,016 -0,009 
    (0,16) (0,09) 
TURNOVER   0,827*** 0,868*** 
    (3,02) (2,94) 
COHESION   0,732** 0,644* 
    (2,35) (1,98) 
FUEL EXPORTS   -0,011 -0,016** 
    (1,61) (2,37) 
METAL EXPORTS   -0,007 -0,005 
    (0,68) (0,45) 
     
R-squared 0,94 0,95 0,97 0,97 
adj R-squared 0,93 0,94 0,96 0,96 
Observations 127,00 127,00 106,00 106,00 
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Table 7. Reduced Model Versions 
 OLS OLS OLS FE OLS OLS OLS FE 
EU Agreement, new 1,060*** 1,413*** 0,998*** -0,026     
 (5,03) (5,99) (4,60) (0,07)     
EU Basic     1,168** 2,101*** 1,127** -0,019 
     (2,53) (5,25) (2,57) (0,05) 
NATO 0,385 0,337 0,524 1,362*** 1,318** 1,690*** 1,433*** 1,336*** 
 (0,77) (0,61) (1,06) (3,78) (2,75) (3,75) (3,19) (3,24) 
AID -0,103** 0,110 -0,079 -0,035 -0,132** 0,086 -0,097 -0,035 
 (2,19) (1,54) (1,42) (0,27) (2,45) (1,26) (1,51) (0,28) 
WESTERN 3,627*** 4,356*** 3,889***  4,260*** 5,143*** 4,544***  
 (7,25) (11,02) (9,57)  (6,90) (10,64) (9,28)  
LIBERALIZATION 1,915***  1,818*** 0,975** 1,939***  1,795*** 0,970*** 
 (6,74)  (5,63) (2,56) (5,51)  (4,55) (2,85) 
EU Potential -0,425 0,213 -0,411  1,331** 2,504*** 1,228**  
 (0,79) (0,29) (0,71)  (2,36) (4,59) (2,19)  
TENSIONS  -1,382*** -0,895   -1,623*** -1,144  
  (4,24) (1,65)   (3,68) (1,63)  
         
R-squared 0,93 0,90 0,94 0,32 0,92 0,89 0,92 0,32 
adjR-squared 0,93 0,89 0,93 0,27 0,91 0,89 0,92 0,27 
Observations 164,00 164,00 164,00 164,00 164,00 164,00 164,00 164,00 
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Table 8. Determinants of Institutional Development in CIS and EU Benchmark 
Countries 
Institutions 
Determi-
nant Rank Group Members 
Determi-
nant, 
value 
POL-
ITY 
2003 
Herall 
2007 
WBGI
all 
2006 
EBRD 
inst 
2007 
Initial Conditions and Endowment 
high EU Baltic 8.59 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
medium high ARM, BLR, RUS, UKR 6.06 6.30 53.76 -0.65 2.52 
medium high NMS 5.79 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
medium high GEO, MDA 4.48 6.44 64.26 -0.48 2.25 
medium low AZE, KAZ, KGZ, TJK -2.82 -5.25 58.46 -0.81 2.13 
Democracy 
at Independ-
ence 
low TKM, UZB -6.85 -9.00 51.02 -1.51 1.64 
high EU Baltic 0.88 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
high RUS, BLR, UKR, ARM, GEO 0.86 6.27 54.09 -0.65 2.51 
medium high KAZ, AZE, MDA, TKM 0.78 -4.85 56.35 -0.79 2.09 
medium low NMS 0.75 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
Human De-
velopment 
at Independ-
ence 
low UBZ, KGZ, TJK 0.69 -7.16 54.30 -1.37 1.78 
high BLR, RUS 7674.62 6.11 53.58 -0.72 2.53 
high EU Baltic 7602.83 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
medium high ARM, GEO, KAZ, UKR 5551.08 4.03 56.52 -0.49 2.45 
medium low AZE, MDA, TKM 4525.58 -3.85 52.87 -0.95 1.81 
low NMS 3874.84 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
Income at 
Independ-
ence 
low KGZ, TJK, UZB 2845.68 -7.16 54.30 -1.37 1.78 
positive 
(rents) 
AZE, KAZ, RUS, 
UZB, TKM 42.58 2.98 54.08 -0.82 2.40 
negative low EU Baltic -4.31 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
negative me-
dium NMS -7.38 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
negative me-
dium BLR, KGZ, TJK -13.88 -4.86 53.18 -1.04 1.80 
Resource 
negative high ARM, GEO MDA, UKR -34.44 6.32 53.18 -0.46 2.45 
Learning by Doing 
high BLR, TKM 0.92 -7.64 45.81 -1.18 1.51 
high AZE, GEO, KAZ, TJK, UZB 0.43 -6.27 56.58 -1.08 1.97 
medium high ARM, KGZ, MDA 0.00 2.76 62.09 -0.66 2.23 
medium low EU Baltic -0.10 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
low RUS, UKR -0.25 7.00 53.84 -0.64 2.56 
Progress in 
Control 
Corruption 
low NMS -0 26 8.26 61 50 0.12 2.86 
high KAZ, TKM, UZB 6.58 -8.02 54.09 -1.22 1.89 
high AZE, BLR, TJK 6.25 -5.96 52.53 -1.01 1.81 
medium high KGZ, MDA, RUS 6.00 6.70 54.35 -0.70 2.56 
medium low ARM, UKR, GEO 5.67 6.73 55.49 -0.46 2.46 
low NMS 4.00 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
Corruption 
Level 
low EL Baltic 3.25 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
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continue Table 8. 
Institutions 
Determi-
nant Rank Group Members 
Determi-
nant, 
value 
POL-
ITY 
2003 
Herall 
2007 
WBGI
all 
2006 
EBRDi
nst 
2007 
Geography, Trade and Policy 
high EU Baltic 3.33 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
medium high ARM, GEO, KGZ, MDA 3.16 3.36 63.88 -0.59 2.21 
medium high NMS 3.14 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
medium low AZE, KAZ, RUS, UKR,  TJK 2.81 5.32 54.42 -0.66 2.51 
Progress in 
Liberaliza-
tion 
low TKM, UZ8, BLR 1.52 -8.51 50.13 -1.40 1.66 
large EU Baltic 71.39 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
large NMS 64.85 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
medium RUS, TJK 55.84 6.58 54.13 -0.71 2.54 
medium ARM, AZE, BLR, KAZ 44.72 -5.58 56.42 -0.77 2.13 
small MDA, UKR 27.14 7.08 53.84 -0.48 2.49 
Volume of 
EU Trade 
small GEO, TKM, UZB, KGZ 15.55 -6.65 54.15 -1.31 1.75 
long EU Baltic 4.50 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
medium long NMS 3.26 8.28 61.50 0.12 2.86 
medium long RUS, BLR,UKR 2.71 6.32 53.53 -0.66 2.52 
short MDA, GEO 0.74 6.44 64.26 -0.48 2.25 
EU Borders 
no TKM, UZB 0.00 -6.47 55.62 -1.10 1.92 
long EU Baltic 1490.48 8.59 71.92 0.77 3.39 
medium long NMS 1750.68 8.26 61.50 0.12 2.86 
medium long BLR, UKR, MDA, RUS 2117.06 6.35 53.65 -0.66 2.52 
short ARM, AZE, GEO 3432.90 -1.24 61.91 -0.63 2.11 
Distance to 
EU 
short KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM, UZB 4369.58 -6.74 49.61 -1.09 1.70 
Notes: Democracy at Independence measured with Polity IV in 1991; Human Develop-
ment at Independence measured with HDI in 1990; Income at Independence measured 
with GNP per capita in 1989; Resource Dependence shows fuel net exports in 2000; Pro-
gress in Control of Corruption is due to the difference in Freedom House Corruption Indi-
cator from 1999-2006; Corruption Level measured with Freedom House Corruption Indi-
cator in 2006; Progress in Liberalization is due to the difference in EBRDlib 1989-2006; 
Volume of EU Trade shows the balance of trade with the EU. 
Source: World Bank, Polity Database, Heritage Foundation, EBRD; De Melo 1996. 
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Table 9. Institutional Quality and Its Determinants in Selected Transition Countries 
  Ukraine Georgia Azerbai-jan Russia CIS 
EU Bal-
tic NMS 
Institutions 
standard-
ized 0,85 0,75 0,15 0,85 0,66 0,93 0,91 POLITY, 
2003 
real 7,00 5,00 -7,00 7,00 3,20 8,59 8,26 
standard-
ized 0,53 0,69 0,55 0,54 0,54 0,72 0,62 Herall, 
2007 
real 53,35 68,70 55,36 54,01 54,37 71,92 61,50 
standard-
ized 0,41 0,42 0,33 0,36 0,35 0,65 0,52 WBGIall, 
2006 
real -0,47 -0,40 -0,87 -0,69 -0,76 0,77 0,12 
EBRDins
t, 2007 
standard-
ized 0,41 0,32 0,27 0,43 0,37 0,65 0,51 
 real 2,50 2,17 2,00 2,58 2,37 3,39 2,86 
Determinants 
Initial Conditions and Endowment 
Democracy at  
Independence 6 4 -3 6 3,28 8,59 5,79 
Human Development 
at Independence 0,84 0,83 0,77 0,86 0,83 0,88 0,75 
Income at Independ-
ence 5680 5590 4620 7720 6302,25 7602,83 3874,84 
Resource Depend-
ence -38 -13 80 47 n.a. -5,83 -5 
Learning by Doing 
Progress in Control 
of Corruption  -0,25 0,5 0,15 -0,25 -0,03 -0,1 -0,26 
Corruption Level  5,75 5,5 6,25 6 6,13 3,25 4 
Geography, Trade and Policy 
Progress in  
Liberalization  2,89 3,22 2,89 2,78 2,64 3,33 3,14 
Volume of EU Trade 27,11 19,42 46,68 55,89 43,26 71,39 64,85 
EU Borders 2 0,5 0 3 1,99 4,5 3,26 
Distance to EU 1836,2 3114,82 3659,48 2253,26 2677,39 1489,64 1769,69 
Source: World Bank, Polity Database, Heritage Foundation, EBRD; De Melo 1996. 
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Table 10. Institutional Development in the CIS According to EU Cooperation Level 
(2006) 
Level of EU-Cooperation 
EU Membership 2004* 0.62 0.98 0.49 0.68 0.83 0.44 0.28 
Czech Republic 0.79 0.96 0.75 1.01 0.95 0.73 0.36 
Estonia 1.03 1.01 0.78 1.17 1.42 0.91 0.87 
Hungary 0.32 1.14 0.73 0.71 1.10 0.73 0.51 
Latvia 0.72 0.83 0.81 0.73 1.06 0.52 0.38 
Lithuania 0.70 0.93 0.89 0.82 1.02 0.45 0.11 
Poland 0.45 0.95 0.22 0.49 0.64 0.25 0.14 
Slovak Republic 0.77 0.99 0.85 0.91 1.08 0.43 0.35 
Slovenia 0.96 1.10 1.05 1.11 0.78 0.79 0.92 
Baltics 0.77 0.91 0.84 0.86 1.11 0.56 0.34 
EU Membership 2007 0.12 0.46 0.16 0.00 0.41 -0.16 -0.15 
Bulgaria 0.22 0.56 0.29 0.14 0.54 -0.17 -0.05 
Romania 0.09 0.43 0.12 -0.05 0.37 -0.16 -0.18 
SAA Partnership -0.05 0.21 -0.04 0.06 0.10 -0.34 -0.31 
Albania -0.39 -0.01 -0.37 -0.42 -0.14 -0.70 -0.67 
Croatia 0.29 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.35 -0.03 -0.02 
Macedonia -0.28 0.07 -0.66 -0.20 -0.06 -0.46 -0.37 
PCA Cooperation -0.67 -0.76 -0.59 -0.53 -0.50 -0.87 -0.76 
ENP Cooperation -0.51 -0.29 -0.42 -0.56 -0.41 -0.71 -0.68 
Ukraine -0.47 -0.11 -0.27 -0.57 -0.47 -0.72 -0.67 
Georgia -0.40 -0.16 -0.86 -0.16 -0.22 -0.61 -0.36 
Azerbaijan -0.87 -1.14 -1.07 -0.70 -0.44 -0.86 -0.99 
Non-ENP Cooperation -0.84 -1.08 -0.81 -0.63 -0.71 -1.00 -0.83 
Russia -0.69 -0.87 -0.74 -0.43 -0.45 -0.91 -0.76 
Note. PCA Cooperation includes ARM, AZE, GEO, MDA, UKR, RUS, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, 
TAJ, TKM, UZB. ENP Cooperation includes ARM. AZE. GEO. MDA. UKR. Non-ENP 
Cooperation includes RUS, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TAJ, TKM, UZB. 
Source: EU Agreement Data Base (own summary). 
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Figure 1. Governance Deficit and Income Fragility in 2006 
 
Note: no Data on GDP per capita for Turkmenistan in 2006. 
Source: World Bank (2006); own calculations. 
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Figure 2. Institutions in the Sample of Countries, 1990-2007 
 
 
 
